We hypothesize that a source of commonality in a stock's liquidity arises from correlated trading among the stock's investors. Focusing on correlated trading of mutual funds, we find that stocks with high mutual fund ownership have comovements in liquidity that are about twice as large as those for stocks with low mutual fund ownership. We also find that stocks owned by mutual funds with higher turnover and those owned by mutual funds that experience liquidity shocks themselves have higher commonality in liquidity. These results suggest an important role for the demand side of liquidity in explaining commonality. The authors would like to thank Mark Seasholes and participants at the AFA meetings for very helpful comments.
A stock's liquidity and the risk that arises from potential illiquidity are important factors for many investors in their investment decisions. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show theoretically that returns of financial assets should depend on their level of liquidity, a prediction that has been supported by a number of empirical studies (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and (1989) , Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) and Amihud (2002) ). More recently, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) , Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) , Huberman and Halka (2001) , and Eckbo and Norli (2002) document that liquidity covaries across stocks. This commonality in liquidity can arise from both supply-side and demand-side sources. While studies have found support for supply-side sources (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes, 2008) , other studies indicate that the supply-side sources suggested in Cougehnor and Saad (2004) cannot explain all of the commonality in liquidity (e.g., Brockman and Chung, 2002; Bauer, 2004) . 1 In this paper we examine a demand-side source of commonality in liquidity, namely correlated trading among investors. Specifically, we examine the role of mutual funds as an investor group that can be a source of commonality in liquidity and show that mutual funds are an important factor in explaining commonality in liquidity.
We argue that demand for liquidity of investors with similar holdings and trading patterns are relevant in determining commonality in liquidity. The intuition is as follows:
Certain groups of investors might trade stocks in a similar way, e.g., based on a change in their information environment or based on liquidity shocks they face themselves.
Furthermore, if these investors hold many different stocks at the same time, they are also often likely to be trading them at the same time. Consequently, these stocks experience joint buying or selling pressure, respectively, as long as the trades within this group of investors do not completely cancel out, i.e., if their trading shows a systematic component. If the group of investors tends to hold specific stocks more than other stocks, these stocks will eventually be characterized by strong co-movement of their individual liquidity.
Mutual funds are a prime example of an investor group that could give rise to such an effect. Previous research has provided evidence of correlated trading by mutual funds and other institutional investors. 2 We test this basic hypothesis using a similar approach to the two-step method suggested in Coughenour and Saad (2004) in their examination of the role of market makers in explaining commonality. Using data on mutual fund ownership and stock liquidity from NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period 1980 to 2008, we first regress a stock's liquidity on two liquidity portfolios: the liquidity of the market portfolio and the liquidity of a portfolio consisting of stocks with high mutual fund ownership, where liquidity is defined by the Amihud (2002) measure of daily stock liquidity.
Correlated trading emerges if these investors face correlated liquidity shocks themselves and if they trade in the same direction based on the same information. Mutual funds typically hold large, well-diversified portfolios and they regularly face liquidity shocks in the form of positive or negative net-flows of new money. These net-flows that mutual funds experience are typically highly correlated across funds, i.e. if one fund faces outflows (inflows), many others face outflows (inflows) at the same time. Furthermore, evidence exists that institutional investors tend to trade in the same direction given a specific information environment, which will also lead to joint buying or selling pressure in stocks. Consequently, we hypothesize that the liquidity of stocks with high mutual fund ownership will co-move with each other. 2 See, for example, Wermers (1999), Sias and Starks (1997), or Sias (2004) . This approach results in two beta coefficients, a market liquidity beta and a high mutual fund ownership liquidity beta. (For the sake of brevity we will label the beta on the liquidity of 3 Coughenour and Saad (2004) , in their analysis of common market makers on commonality, use the liquidity of a portfolio of shares that have the same market maker as second explanatory variable. the high mutual fund ownership portfolio, β HI , or, the mutual fund liquidity beta.) In the second step of our analysis, we examine the relation between a stock's mutual fund liquidity beta and the extent to which the stock is owned by mutual funds. We find that the liquidity of stocks with high mutual fund ownership is characterized by a mutual fund liquidity beta about twice the size of that of stocks with low mutual fund ownership, i.e. the liquidity of stocks with high mutual fund ownership co-moves about twice as strongly with the liquidity of other high mutual fund ownership stocks than with the liquidity of stocks with low mutual fund ownership.
These results are consistent with mutual funds serving as sources of both demandside and supply-side sources of liquidity. We differentiate between the two in our later examinations on information-based and particularly flow-based trading, situations in which mutual funds would be demanding, rather than supplying, liquidity. These results suggest an important role for demand-side factors in explaining commonality.
An alternative explanation for these results is that mutual funds hold stocks with specific characteristics that explain commonality. That is, our results could be driven by individual stock characteristics such as firm size or level of liquidity that might jointly determine systematic liquidity and mutual fund ownership (e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Bennett, Sias and Starks, 2003; Massa and Phallippou, 2005) . To test this alternative hypothesis, we conduct several refinements of our analysis. We examine the relationship between mutual fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity beta within size and liquidity level quartiles. The positive relationship between mutual fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity beta is strongest among large and liquid stocks, which tend to be the stocks most favored by mutual funds. However, the result also generally holds within all subsets except for the very smallest stocks, which is not surprising because mutual funds typically are not the dominant holders (or traders) of these types of stocks. Further, we also find the positive relation between mutual fund ownership and the mutual fund liquidity beta to continue to hold in a multivariate setting while controlling for the effects of a set of individual stock characteristics.
If the impact of ownership on commonality is driven by the trading activity of mutual funds, as we hypothesize, then one would expect this commonality to be stronger in the presence of larger mutual fund trading. To examine this, we consider the two types of mutual fund trading: voluntary trading (often associated with information-based investment strategies) and involuntary (forced) trading (caused by liquidity shocks from fund flows). A mutual fund's level of voluntary trading is reflected in the fund's turnover ratio after controlling for the fund's flow-induced trading. If a high proportion of the mutual funds' voluntary trading is due to correlations in information-based trading across funds, then we would expect a relation between the level of such trading and commonality in liquidity. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that mutual fund liquidity betas are greater when stocks are owned by mutual funds with high turnover ratios than for stocks that are owned by mutual funds that do not trade a lot. Forced trading will be observed when mutual funds experience large absolute flows.
This creates selling or buying pressure for those shares typically owned and traded by mutual funds (Ben-Rephael, Kandel, and Wohl, 2008) . Furthermore, one would expect a difference between the effects of inflows and outflows as funds can accumulate cash before they have to trade based on inflows, but outflows can force the fund to eventually trade in order to meet redemptions (e.g., Edelen and Warther, 2001) . We find strong evidence that suggests flow-driven liquidity shocks are an important driver of the effects of the mutual fund ownership results that we document. The impact of mutual fund ownership on a firm's mutual fund liquidity beta is about 50% greater in quarters with high absolute aggregate flows as compared to quarters with low absolute aggregate flows.
The effect is particularly pronounced for negative flow quarters. This evidence supports the hypothesis that liquidity shocks that mutual funds face propagate through to the commonality among the stocks they hold.
We also employ a more direct proxy for mutual fund trading by using changes in mutual fund ownership obtained from quarterly SEC filings, which reflect the outcome of the aggregate trading activity of mutual funds in a stock. This measure is a lower bound on actual mutual fund trading activity because it does not capture trades within the quarter. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a strong positive relation between changes in a stock's aggregate mutual fund ownership and its mutual fund liquidity beta.
Our results are stable over time and hold in different specifications if we include firm fixed effects or run Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. Overall, our results suggest an important role for mutual fund ownership and eventually liquidity demand in explaining commonality in liquidity across stocks. Thus, the main contribution of our paper is to show that commonality in liquidity is dependent on demand-side factors in addition to the supply-side factors shown in earlier research (Coughenour and Saad, 2004) .
Our paper contributes to three main lines of research. First, it contributes to the broad empirical literature on liquidity. Many papers document the impact of liquidity on expected returns (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) , Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998), Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman (2000) , Jones (2002 ), Amihud (2002 , Chordia, Huh and Subrahmanyam (2007), and Hasbrouck (2009) ). Several studies document the existence of commonality in liquidity, in the U.S. as well as internationally (e.g., Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Brockman, Chung and Perignon, 2007; Karolyi, Lee and vanDijk, 2008) . Further the relevance of commonality for asset pricing is highlighted in the theoretical work of Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . Some empirical evidence on commonality as a priced risk factor is provided in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005 ), Sadka (2006 ), and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008 .
The literature trying to explain commonality in liquidity is primarily based on the supply side arguments put forward in Coughenour and Saar (2004) , who propose that the commonality arises from the same NYSE specialist providing liquidity for many stocks.
They show that stocks with the same specialist have commonality in liquidity. Consistent with this idea, Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes (2008) provide evidence that the aggregate inventory of all NYSE specialists is an important determinant of aggregate market liquidity. We contribute to this strand of the literature by showing the role of mutual funds in explaining commonality via the demand side. The importance of the demand side of liquidity in explaining liquidity levels is provided by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) who find that aggregate order imbalancewhich is a measure for liquidity demand -reduces liquidity. However, their focus is on liquidity levels, while our contribution is to show that liquidity demand has an impact on commonality of liquidity, too. The impact of liquidity demanding trades on movements in market prices is also examined in Hendershott and Seasholes (2009).
Second, our findings complement the literature on the impact of correlated trading of certain investor groups on return co-movements. Greenwood (2009) shows that common trading patterns of index investors can give rise to substantial excess co-movement of stock returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2006) find that correlated trading among institutional and retail investors, respectively, gives rise to return comovement. 4 Finally, our study also contributes to the general literature on the influence of institutional investors on financial markets. Several studies examine the impact of institutional investors on corporate governance (e.g., Gillan and Starks, 2000, 2007) , executive compensation (Hartzell and Starks, 2003) , analyst recommendations More closely related to our paper, Greenwood and Thesmar (2009) also use mutual fund ownership and mutual fund flows to get a proxy for correlated trading.
Looking at the 1990 to 2008 period they show that stocks owned by mutual funds with correlated inflows exhibit larger return comovement. However, none of these papers investigates the link between correlated trading and comovement in liquidity. (Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei and Yan, 2007) , mergers (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007) , and stock market returns (Sias and Starks, 1997; Sias, Starks and Titman, 2006) .
More closely related to our paper is the paper of Massa (2004) , that shows that a large number of uninformed mutual funds can increase the level of liquidity of stocks. The interplay between liquidity levels, investment strategies, and the performance of mutual funds is examined in Massa and Phallippou (2005) . While all of these studies focus on liquidity levels, Kamara, Lou and Sadka (2008) examine the impact of changing aggregate levels of institutional ownership on commonality. They find that commonality increases over time. Consistent with our results, they argue that this is driven by the increasing importance of institutional investors over time. We complement their findings by showing the channels through which institutional investments can give rise to commonality.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe our data and the construction of our main variables. Our empirical analysis regarding commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership is presented in Section II and in Section III we consider proxies for mutual fund trading. Section IV provides the results from several robustness tests and Section V concludes.
I. Data and variable construction
Our initial sample is based on mutual funds with holdings in the CDA/Spectrum database over the period 1980--2008. We match the holdings of these mutual funds to other fund variables in the CRSP mutual fund database using MFLINKS. We also obtain characteristics on the underlying stocks through the CRSP stocks database.
A. Variable Definitions
Ideally we would be able to directly observe mutual fund trades in order to measure each stock's degree of correlated trading through time. Because we have mutual fund ownership and periodic changes in ownership, rather than trades, we create a stocklevel proxy for the likelihood of correlated trading based on the percentage of shares outstanding held by mutual funds. Specifically, we construct a quarterly stock-level measure of aggregate mutual fund ownership.
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. The fraction of ownership mfown i,t , in a stock i owned by the J mutual funds in our sample at quarter t, is Conceptually this can be thought of as assigning a probability measure of how much a share will be traded in a correlated fashion in the next period with shares owned by mutual funds. In this way our measure of mutual fund ownership can be thought of as a share-weighted average probability of correlated trading. We also develop a measure of turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership, twmfown i,t , based on the assumption that fund turnover is a proxy for the probability that the fund will be trading its shares in a firm.
That is, instead of assigning a probability of being traded based on mutual fund ownership,, the likelihood of a stock's being traded using this alternative proxy is higher for funds with high turnover. Thus, we weight the probability by turnover. To construct this variable, we multiply the number of shares held by a mutual fund by the fund's turnover ratio and then aggregate the holdings across the mutual funds at the end of each quarter:
( ) We calculate the daily change in stock illiquidity for all common stocks on the NYSE and AMEX that are not penny stocks (i.e., price is above $2 per share) and that trade on day d and d-1. To prevent outliers from affecting our analysis, we eliminate the top and bottom 1% of observations of our measure. (2008) . This is done to reduce effects of non-stationarity. However, in light of concerns of overdifferencing, we also replicate the main results using the difference in Amihud's illiquidity measure from its five day moving average (see Section IV).
B. Summary Statistics
Using the turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership reduces the sample to 46,117 stockquarters because turnover data is only available beginning in 1999. The median firm is about $911 million in market value and about 11% of its shares are owned by mutual funds on average over the sample period. The mean turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership is slightly smaller than un-weighted mutual fund ownership, reflecting a typical annual fund turnover ratio of less than one (in our sample the average fund turnover is 0.83). In the last row we report summary statistics on aggregate quarterly netflows into or out of the equity mutual fund industry. Not surprisingly, out of the total 114
8 We require at least 40 return observations per quarter to estimate our liquidity betas (Section II.A).
quarters over the 1980Q2 through 2008Q3 sample period, mutual funds in general experience inflows. However, the industry experienced aggregate outflows in 17 of the quarters, with the largest aggregate quarterly outflow equaling 3.05% of the NYSE and AMEX market capitalization, compared to the largest aggregate quarterly inflow of 2.83%.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the summary statistics divided by quartile of mutual fund ownership. In each quarter we rank stocks by mfown and report means, standard deviations, and medians of the selected variables. Typical stock size is about $3 billion in the lowest and highest quartiles of mfown compared to $7 and $4 billion for the second and third quartiles respectively. There is, however, a monotonic relationship between mutual fund ownership and average liquidity; moving from the lowest to highest quartile of mfown, the illiq(avg) drop from 0.24 to 0.04. Overall, mutual fund ownership as a fraction of shares outstanding is increasing in liquidity and nonlinear in firm size.
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II. Commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership
To examine the extent to which mutual fund ownership determines co-movement in liquidity, we follow an approach similar to that in Coughenour and Saad (2004) . In the first step, we estimate how individual stock liquidity co-moves with the liquidity of a portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks after controlling for comovement with market liquidity and additional variables (Section II.A). In the second step we investigate whether co-movement between individual stocks and the high mfown portfolio is stronger among firms with high mutual fund ownership (Section II.B).
9 Correlations between our main variables of interest are presented in Table 3 .
A. Estimating liquidity covariances
Our first step is to estimate for each firm-quarter the covariance between the daily changes in a stock's illiquidity and changes in the illiquidity of a portfolio of stocks with high mutual fund ownership. We control for the widely documented co-movement of individual illiquidity with market illiquidity (Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam, 2000) .
Thus, for each trading day in the quarter we compute changes in the value-weighted illiquidity of two portfolios:
10 For each firm, we then run quarterly time series regressions of the firm's daily change in illiquidity, ∆illiq i,t , on changes in the market illiquidity, ∆illiq mkt,t , and changes in the high mutual fund ownership portfolios' illiquidity, ∆illiq mfown,t , as well as control variables.
a market portfolio containing all stocks and a high mutual fund ownership portfolio comprised of the stocks in the top quartile of mutual fund ownership as ranked at the end of the previous quarter.
(1)
We focus on changes, or to be precise changes in logs, because we want to investigate comovements in liquidity. Furthermore, this helps to avoid econometric problems due to the potential nonstationarity of the liquidity measure. For each regression, the firm of interest is removed from the market portfolio as well as the high mutual fund ownership portfolio (when applicable). We follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and include lead, lag and contemporaneous market returns, contemporaneous firm return squared, and lead and lag changes in the two portfolio illiquidity measures. We include the latter controls to capture lagged adjustments, while the market returns are included to control for possible correlations between returns and our illiquidity measure. Squared stock returns are included to capture volatility which might be related to liquidity. We require a 10 Results using equal-weighted portfolios are very similar (see Section IV).
minimum of 40 observations for each firm-quarter.
11 Table 2 presents sample statistics on the market and high mutual fund ownership portfolios used in the time series regressions as well as coefficients of interest from the regressions. In the top panel we report a quarterly summary for quarters from the beginning (1980), the middle (1995) and the end (2008) different from zero at the 5%-level based on two-sided t-tests. This is probably due to the large noise in the firm level regressions, which are conducted on a quarterly basis.
We show later in robustness tests (Section IV) that this particular specification of the first stage time series regressions is not crucial to our main results.
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The bottom panel summarizes the time series regression output by 5 year periods.
We calculate summary variables and tstatistics for each quarter as above, and in this panel we report averages of these quarterly summary variables. For example, in the While few of the individual quarterly estimates are statistically significant, the mean of the distribution of estimates is different from zero with a high degree of significance as indicated by the t-statistic on the sample of estimates. Overall, the positive average and the similar magnitude of the two beta coefficients clearly shows that individual stock liquidity on average co-moves positively with both the liquidity of the market portfolio as well as the liquidity of a high mutual fund ownership portfolio.
1980-1985 period the typical quarter has a mean β HI equal to 0.26 and the average tstatistic on each quarter's sample of estimates is 5.10.
Table 2 also shows that, not surprisingly, the size of the average firm is increasing over time. However, the average size of firms in the high mutual fund ownership portfolio is smaller than the average size of the firms in the market portfolio. Average mutual fund ownership over the entire sample of stocks is also increasing through time.
The average mutual fund ownership in a stock is 4% in 1980 and this number increases to in the highest quartile of mutual fund ownership. The average illiquidity among the stocks in this portfolio is always lower than the average illiquidity of the stocks in the market portfolio. This result shows that mutual funds prefer liquid stocks, which is also similar to results from earlier studies (e.g., Falkenstein, 1996) .
B. Mutual Fund Ownership and Commonality
Our central hypothesis is that the liquidity of stocks with high levels of mutual fund ownership will covary strongly with other stocks also owned to a high degree by mutual funds. Table 4 provides results from a first set of tests of our central hypothesis using one dimensional and dependent sorts based on quarterly rankings of mutual fund ownership. In this and all future tests, β HI and β mkt are estimated over quarter t, while mutual fund ownership is measured at the end of quarter t-1.
Panel A shows that the average β HI is monotonically increasing in mutual fund ownership as predicted by the hypothesis. The lowest quartile has an average β HI of 0.19 compared to 0.36 for the highest quartile. The difference is economically and statistically significant, providing evidence that the liquidity of stocks owned to a high degree by mutual funds strongly covary together. These findings provide first evidence for our central hypothesis.
We also report results from sorts based on firm size and liquidity. They show that a relation also appears to exist between β HI and firm size and between β HI and the level of illiquidity. These are mainly driven by the small and illiquid stocks as there is much less difference in the mutual fund liquidity beta across the other three quartiles.
The results for β HI can be contrasted with those for β mkt . There is no significant difference between the comovement of stocks' liquidity with the market liquidity in the highest and lowest mutual fund ownership quartiles. However, there are strongly significant differences between the comovement of a stock's liquidity with the market liquidity in the highest and lowest size and illiquidity, respectively, quartiles. Our results
show that large and liquid stocks co-move more heavily with both market as well high mutual fund ownership portfolio liquidity as compared to small and illiquid stocks.
The results presented thus far are univariate in nature. However, mutual funds do not randomly select stocks but have preferences for stock with certain characteristics.
Most importantly, in aggregate they prefer large and liquid stocks (see, e.g., Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996) . Our previous results suggest that these characteristics are also related to β HI . Thus, in Panel B of Table 4 we provide the results on the average liquidity betas for double sorts based on these variables and mutual fund ownership. The sorting is first done on size or illiquidity and then on mutual fund ownership. The results show that the positive relation between β HI and mutual fund ownership is robust to subsets by firm size and illiquidity. In all cases the average β HI is increasing in mutual fund ownership although the effect is insignificant among the smallest and most illiquid stocks.
In a second test of our central hypothesis we control for stock characteristics in a multivariate regression. That is, we regress β HI against the previous quarter's mutual fund ownership, controlling for firm size and average illiquidity. There are likely both firm and time effects in the data. Thus, we include time dummies and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. This accounts for all time series and cross sectional dependence as long as the time effect is fixed (Petersen (2009) We find affirmation that stocks with a high likelihood of correlated trading as measured by mutual fund ownership exhibit strong co-movement, evidenced by a b 1 estimate of 0.885 and a t-statistic of 15.04. As this regression includes time fixed effects, the higher β HI should not be caused by a possible common time trend in mutual fund ownership levels and liquidity comovements.
In the second column we include size and illiq(avg) as controls. Again the coefficient on mutual fund ownership is positive and highly significant, and is similar in magnitude to the coefficient estimated in the absence of controls. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase (0.10) in mutual fund ownership is associated with a 0.09 increase in β HI , which equates to a 30% increase from its mean.
Potential alternative explanations
Other explanations exist that could potentially explain our results. For example, perhaps mutual fund portfolio managers have a preference for a stock characteristic that is correlated with β HI . Although it is not clear what the source of the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and correlation might be, in column 3 we include firm fixed effects to address this concern. We continue to include time dummies and cluster standard errors at the firm level. The results show that time invariant unobservable heterogeneity is not driving our results.
The last two columns of the table use corrections for different assumptions on the structure of the error term. The fourth column reports results using standard errors with two dimensional clustering, and the last column uses a Fama-MacBeth specification.
In both cases the coefficient estimate is similar to the main specification in column 2 in magnitude and statistical significance.
As further robustness tests, we repeat the tests in Panel A using an indicator variable for high mutual fund ownership (i.e., a dummy variable equal to one if mutual fund ownership is in the top quartile in that quarter and zero otherwise) rather than a continuous variable. We report these results in Panel B of Table 5 . The use of this variable provides a natural economic interpretation. From column 2 panel B, stocks in the highest mutual fund ownership quartile have a β HI in the next quarter that is 0.11 higher than those outside the top quartile. This is a large economic effect given the unconditional mean β HI of 0.30. The coefficient on this dummy variable is positive and statistically significant in all other specifications as well.
Subsamples
The sorts in Table 4 indicate a possible non-linear relation between β HI and firm size. Thus, we rerun our primary specification (quarter fixed effects and firm clusters) for samples divided by size quartiles, additionally controlling for size and liquidity within each subsample. We also conduct this test for subsamples divided by liquidity, time (5 year subperiods), and whether the quarter had an up or down market return. Table 6 reports these results again for a linear impact of mfown (Panel A) as well as for the impact of the high mutual fund ownership dummy used above (Panel B).
In both panels, the first four columns split the sample into size quartiles (ranked quarterly) and show that a significantly relation between β HI and mutual fund ownership on. Exists in all but one of the subsamples, the quartile of stocks with the smallest market capitalization. This result is consistent with our results using dependent sorts in Panel B
of Table 4 where we did not find a significant relationship for the most illiquid stocks. Once controls for size are included, the relationship exists.
When we divide our sample into approximate 5-year subsamples from 1980 to 2008 (with the last subperiod containing almost 8 years), we find that the effect exists in all subperiods, but the magnitude of the coefficient for the relation between β HI and mutual fund ownership varies over time.
Motivated by results of magnified liquidity effects in down markets in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2008), we also look at subsamples of up as well as down market quarters. We find a strong effect in both cases. The difference between the coefficients in the up versus down market subsamples is not significant. This shows that while previous paper could document higher commonality in liquidity in down markets, up vs. down markets have no impact on the role of mutual fund ownership in explaining liquidity. Rather, results are stable across market regimes.
Overall, these results show that the liquidity of stocks with high mutual fund ownership strongly co-move. The effect is robust to various assumptions regarding unobserved heterogeneity and independence of observations, as well as numerous subsamples.
III. Commonality in liquidity and mutual fund trading
In the previous section we provide strong evidence that commonality in a stock's liquidity is highly associated with the level of mutual fund ownership in the stock. Our argument is that this relationship exists because mutual fund ownership proxies for the likelihood that trading will be correlated. Therefore, it is not only the level of ownership that matters per se, but the extent to which it reflects future correlated trading. In the following we offer a few possible improvements on our proxy for future correlated trading.
We construct three proxies to capture future correlated trading: a proxy for voluntary trading, a proxy for forced trading, and a proxy for overall trading. . The first proxy is based on a fund's turnover ratio corrected for the impact of fund flows. This should be an improvement as compared to the pure ownership based measure used above, as we would not expect unchanged ownership positions to have much impact on liquidity.
However, voluntary trading could reflect trading by mutual funds providing liquidity to other market participants as well as their information-based trading. Since only the latter would be consistent with mutual funds demanding liquidity and eventually giving rise to commonality via this channel, we include a second measure of future correlated trading which is designed to capture the effects of liquidity shocks to the fund itself due to inflows or outflows. These flows can lead to buying or selling pressure of mutual funds, i.e. liquidity demand. Consequently, if commonality among mutual fund owned stocks is higher in periods of high absolute flows, this is a clear indication that mutual funds have an impact on commonality via their liquidity demand. Finally, as a conservative proxy to capture the overall trading of mutual funds in a stock we use the change in fraction of shares owned by a mutual funds.
A. Mutual fund turnover
As a first approach to better capture the probability of correlated trading, we use turnover weighted mutual fund ownership instead of (unweighted) mutual fund ownership. Simply put, if we assume that every mutual fund trade is correlated, then a stock held by funds with high turnover is more likely to be traded in a correlated fashion than a stock with a similar mutual fund ownership level, but held by funds with low turnover. Using each fund's turnover data from CRSP, we calculate twmfown, as described earlier (Section II.B). Clearly turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership will be larger for a stock predominantly held by funds with high turnover relative to a stock with the same level of ownership, but owned by funds with low turnover. The definition of the turnover ratio as reported in CRSP is already corrected for the impact of flows.
Thus, turnover is capturing voluntary trading of the mutual fund.
We expect to find that the turnover-weighted measure, to the extent that it is a better proxy for correlated demand in liquidity, is more strongly associated with high commonality in liquidity than an unconditional measure of mutual fund ownership.
13 Table 1 shows large similarity in the means of the weighted and unweighted mutual fund ownership measures, which suggests that we can directly compare the coefficients of the two measures. Such a comparison shows that the coefficient for the turnoverweighted mutual fund ownership measure in column 3 is 1.287, is clearly larger than the coefficient for the unweighted mutual fund ownership, which is 0.251. In addition, we use standardized values to ensure that the differences in coefficients are not due =to different distributions in the independent variables. Column 6 shows that a one standard
Because the quarterly CRSP turnover data begins in 1999, the sample period for these tests are from 1999 through 2008. The results are reported in Table 7 . For comparison, the first column repeats the evaluation of our baseline model using mfown as the primary independent variable for the limited sample 1999 to 2008. The second column uses twmfown only, and the third column includes both twmfown and mfown. The coefficient on the turnover-weighted mutual fund ownership variable is strongly significant, whether un-weighted mutual fund ownership is included in the regression or not.
deviation increase in twmfown results in a increase in β HI which is larger by a magnitude of three as compared to the impact of a one standard deviation increase of mfown. Thus, consistent with our hypothesis, stocks held by mutual funds that trade more frequently have stronger commonality in their liquidity.
Voluntary trading is often information based trading. Thus, the strong impact of voluntary mutual fund trading on commonality suggests that the trading of individual mutual funds does not cancel out. This is consistent with the view that mutual funds tend to trade on the same information in the same direction, which eventually leads to correlated liquidity demand and thus commonality in liquidity.
An alternative story to explain these results is that voluntary trading is not information driven (and thus a sign of liquidity demand), but that mutual funds also act as liquidity suppliers in some cases. Thus, in the following section we focus on the impact of liquidity shocks mutual funds face themselves. This will allow us to isolate cases in which any potential effect most likely works via a demand-side channel.
B. Aggregate fund flows
In Section A we investigate the relation between β HI and a proxy for voluntary mutual fund trading. In this section we estimate the relation between β HI and involuntary correlated trading. Thus, we infer differences in trading intensities using fund flows.
14 It is somewhat difficult to determine the appropriate measure of fund flows to capture the likelihood of mutual fund trading. Computing an aggregate net flow into or out of the mutual fund industry is a natural approach. Periods of highly positive or negative net flows would clearly be those in which funds are more likely to be trading in a correlated fashion. However, it may also be the case that net flows are zero but bimodal, with one group of funds receiving outflows and another inflows. If these groups hold different stocks (which would be possible given that they have opposite flows), then we would still expect high levels of correlated trading. We address this by using aggregate net flows as well as inflows and outflows aggregated separately, to identify periods in which correlated trading is likely.
In each quarter we aggregate fund flows to compute a net dollar flow into or out of the mutual fund industry. We then scale this amount by the dollar value of the total market at the beginning of the quarter. From these flow data we calculate two dummy variables; negnetflow equals one if aggregate flows are negative and zero otherwise, and hinetflow equals one if aggregate flows in a quarter are in the top or bottom 10% of all quarters and zero otherwise. Net flows are signed, so the bottom (top) 10% is comprised of the largest net outflow (inflow) quarters. We also aggregate inflows and outflows separately in each quarter. Then we set hioutflow (hiinflow) equal to one for the top 25% of quarters measured by outflows (inflows) scaled by market cap, and zero otherwise.
Each of these dummy variables is interacted with mfown in the previously described regression specifications used in Table 5 . We continue to use time dummies to pick up general increases or decreases in systematic liquidity during periods of extreme flows.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table 8 Overall, the findings from this section show that not only voluntary informationbased trading in the same direction, but also flow induced liquidity demanding trades gives rise to commonality in liquidity.
C. Changes in mutual fund ownership
Last, we use changes in mutual fund ownership to proxy for correlated trading.
Although we would prefer to observe all changes in mutual fund ownership, i.e., all trades, the data is only available to compute changes on a quarterly basis. Thus, these changes represent a lower bound of actual trading over the period. We measure the change contemporaneously with the estimation of β HI to determine whether higher sensitivity to aggregate mutual fund liquidity occurs in the same period as greater mutual fund trading, which would be consistent with correlated trading by mutual funds contributing to commonality in liquidity. We employ the following specification for this test:
where |∆mfown i,t | is the absolute value of the change in percentage mutual fund ownership from quarter t-1 to t (Section II.B). If our hypothesis holds, then we expect b 1 , the coefficient on the absolute change in mutual fund ownership, to be significantly positive.
The results of this regression are provided in Table 9 . We use the absolute value of the change in mfown in the first column, and a dummy variable equal to one if the absolute change is in the top quartile that quarter, and zero otherwise, in the second column. In both cases the coefficient on the change measure is positive and significant at the 1% level, consistent with our hypothesis that mutual fund trading in a stock as reflected by changes in a stock's mutual fund ownership increases systematic liquidity.
Overall, the results of Tables 7, 8 , and 9 support our hypothesis that the relation between commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership is due to correlations in the trading by mutual funds.
IV. Robustness Tests
We have thus far shown that the relationship between β HI and mfown is robust to different specifications and exhibits several conditional relationships that reduce endogeneity concerns Up to this point we have relied on only one method of liquidity covariance estimation. In this section we show that our results are not dependent on one particular first stage liquidity covariance estimation procedure. Specifically, we reestimate β HI in a number of ways and in Table 10 report results from our main second stage regression of β HI on mfown from model (2).
In the first approach, instead of using value-weighted portfolio liquidity to determine β HI , we regress the individual stock liquidity measure on equalweighted market and high mutual fund ownership portfolios after including the standard controls.
Consistent with our results using value weighted portfolio liquidity, we find a very strong positive relation between the high mutual fund liquidity beta and mutual fund ownership.
In this case, the coefficient is more than twice as large as the coefficient using valueweighted portfolio liquidity (2.096 in Table 10 , column 1, compared to 0.845 in column 2 of Table 5 ).
In the second approach, we employ our standard time series estimation procedure (model 1) but now follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) and also use sum betas in the second stage, which equal β HI plus the betas on the lead and lag values of the high mutual fund ownership (and similarly for the market beta). The results, reported in column 2 of Table 10 , are consistent with our previous results. The liquidity of stocks belonging to the same industry would be expected to comove more strongly with each other than with stocks not in the industry. Thus, in our third approach, we include industry-level measures in the first stage liquidity covariance estimation in two ways. The results reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 10 use a β HI estimated after controlling for the covariation between the firm's liquidity and that of a portfolio of stocks in its industry (and leads and lags and including an industry portfolio as well as lead, lag, and contemporaneous industry returns.) We find that all of these measures of commonality in liquidity in high mutual fund ownership stocks have a positive and significant relationship with mfown.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 10 we use only one liquidity portfolio in the time series estimation. First, we remove the high mutual fund ownership portfolio (and its returns) and estimate a covariance with only the market portfolio. In column 6 we do the same using only a high mutual fund ownership portfolio. Not surprisingly, we find a positive relationship in the second stage between mfown and β mkt , and a positive but much stronger relationship between mfown and β HI .
In Columns 7 and 8 we revert to the standard first stage portfolios and control variables used in the earlier tables, but employ different liquidity calculations. One potential concern is whether change in illiquidity are over-differenced. As suggested by
Cometon-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes (2009), we use a quasi-differencing method in column 7. Instead of using differences in logs of Amihud's illiquidity ratio we use the difference from a 5 day moving average. In Column 8 we use daily stock turnover instead of Amihud's illiquidity ratio as an alternative liquidity proxy.
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Lastly, we generate a portfolio of randomly selected stocks and include it instead of the portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks. Specifically, we randomly choose 25% of the stocks in each quarter and compute a value-weighted change in daily liquidity for this portfolio (and its returns). We then use liquidity betas on this portfolio as independent variable in our regression models. As expected, the liquidity beta on randomly selected stocks' liquidity in this placebo regression is not at all related to mutual fund ownership.
Both variants give similar results to our main specification.
IV. Conclusion
We hypothesize that correlated trading among investors in a stock is an important explanation for commonality in liquidity across stocks. Using data on mutual fund ownership and stock liquidity from NYSE and AMEX stocks for the period 1980 to 2008, we find evidence that suggests mutual funds are an important factor in explaining commonality in liquidity. We use a two-step process by first regressing a stock's liquidity on the liquidity of two portfolios: a market portfolio and a portfolio consisting of stocks with high mutual fund ownership. In the second step, we examine the relation between the mutual fund ownership liquidity beta and the extent to which a stock is owned by mutual funds. We find that mutual fund liquidity betas are about twice as large for stocks with high mutual fund ownership as for those with low mutual fund ownership.
We also find that this result is not driven by stock characteristics such as firm size, level of liquidity or other unobservable stock characteristics that might jointly determine systematic liquidity and mutual fund ownership.
We also expect the relation between commonality in liquidity and mutual fund ownership to be stronger in circumstances with greater mutual fund trading and our results support that hypothesis. We find that the commonality in liquidity is stronger in stocks that are owned by mutual funds with high turnover ratios. We also find that the commonality is greater during periods of negative or extreme aggregate mutual fund flows. Further, we find a strong positive relation between changes in aggregate mutual fund ownership and a stock's mutual fund liquidity beta.
Overall our results suggest that in addition to the supply-side explanations for commonality in liquidity found in earlier studies (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004;  Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, Jones, Moulton and Seasholes, 2008), demand-side factors, i.e., mutual fund ownership and particularly flow-induced trading, are important explanations as well. Thus, liquidity risk arises not only from the actions of market specialists, but also the investors in the stock. These results suggest that mutual fund trading adds to the risk of a stock, consistent with the findings of Sias (1996) In each quarter and for each firm, the daily change in the firm's illiquidity (Amihud measure) is regressed on the daily changes in the illiquidity measure for a market portfolio and a portfolio of high mutual fund ownership stocks and controls. In each time series regression the stock's individual measure is removed from the market portfolio and the high mfown portfolio (when applicable). In each quarter we record the average beta, the percent positive and percent significant at the 5% level, and we compute a t-statistic on the sample of beta estimates in that quarter. Below we summarize these quarterly measures for the full sample and five year periods. For example, the top left cells indicates that the average across all quarters of the mean β mkt computed within each quarter equals 0.28. In the average quarter, 59% of these estimates are positive. The t-statistic computed for each quarter is on average 6.24. 
where β HI is estimated as in equation (1). mfown and ln(size) are measured at the end of the previous quarter. illiq(avg) is the firm's average daily Amihud (2002) where sharesowned j,i,t is the ownership of fund j in stock i at end of quarter t from CDA/Spectrum and turnover j,t is the turnover reported by CRSP for fund j over quarter t. Results are reported for the following regression using the subsample in which the turnover variable is available quarterly from CRSP (1999+):
Column 1 uses twmfown and for comparison column 2 uses the standard (unweighted) mfown over the same sample for which turnover is available (1999+), and both in column 3. The second column uses changes in the turnover-weighted measure of mutual fund ownership. The far right three columns use dummy variables instead of absolute changes. We rank the absolute changes quarterly and set the dummy equal to one if the change is in the top quartile, zero otherwise. Quarter dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by stock. We repeat the standard regression of β HI on mutual fund ownership (as in the first two columns of Table 4 ) using alternate measures of the liquidity betas. Column 1 uses as the dependent variable the liquidity beta estimate on an equal-weighted portfolio of high mfown stocks instead of value-weighting. Column 2 reports results using a sum beta which equals β HI plus the betas on lead and lag values of the high mfown portfolio (measured in the standard way). In column 3 we use β HI on the typical high mfown portfolio, but we also control for liquidity covariation with stocks in the same industry (lead, lag, and contemporaneous changes in the industry portfolio). Column 4 uses β HI from a similar time series regression as in column 3, but we also include contemporaneous, lead and lag returns on the high mfown portfolio as well as those on the industry portfolio. Columns 5 and 6 use only one portfolio in the time series beta estimation, the market portfolio and the high mfown portfolio respectively. Column 7 reports results using changes in liquidity from a five day moving average (as opposed to a first difference). Specifically we compute the change in illiquidity as the log of the ratio of Amihud's illiquidity measure at day t to the average of this measure of the previous five trading days. Column 8 uses turnover instead of Amihud's illiquidity measure. The last column uses the beta on a portfolio of randomly selected stocks. Specifically we choose 25% of the stocks in each quarter and compute a value-weighted change in daily liquidity for this random portfolio. Quarter dummies are included in all regressions and standard errors are clustered by stock.
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